Bulletin N°42-43

The Russian invasion of Ukraine exposed a number of crisis phenomena in Ukrainian society, in particular, the issue of the (co)existence of two competing Orthodox jurisdictions – Orthodox Church of Ukraine (OCU) and Ukrainian Orthodoc Church of Moscow Patriarchate (UOC-MP). Moreover, these crisis phenomena had complex dynamics from the beginning of the war, with time, more and more interested parties were included in these processes.

The "inter-Orthodox crisis" - let's tentatively call it like that - began primarily as an identity crisis within the Ukrainian Orthodox Church with the beginning of the Russian invasion on February 24, 2022. Although sociological studies indicate slow changes in the religious identity of Ukrainians, where 54% belong to the OCU against the background of only 4% of the UOC-MP believers^[1]Sociological data in comparison of 2020-2022 done by KIIS: https://www.kiis.com.ua/?lang=ukr&cat=reports&id=1129&page=1, these quantitative data may not reflect the actual picture or indicate that it is risky to recognize yourself as a member of the UOC-MP now and disrespectful. The percentage of "just Orthodox" Ukrainians decreased from 22% in June 2020 to 14% in July 2022, although again there are no data clarifying such self-identification and the reasons for the decline. We can only assume that after the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, even those Ukrainians who identify themselves as Orthodox became more aware of the church situation, but did not necessarily deepen their spiritual practice. In parallel, according to the comparative data of activists, in the period from December 15, 2018 to April 23, 2023, there were 1,333 changes in the jurisdiction of parishes and monasteries from the UOC-MP to the OCU^[2]Article on the parish transition from different sources: … Continue reading.

Russian full-scale invasion put UOC-MP hierarchy and believers before the choice – are they part of the Russian Orthodox Church (in the canonical sense) or is it a Ukrainian and pro-Ukrainian church on independent basis. As such, the head of the UOC-MP, Metropolitan Onuphryy (Berezovsky), was forced to take a clear position on the war and made an early appeal to believers in which he acknowledged Russian aggression and called for unity in order to protect the sovereignty and integrity of Ukraine.

However, at the beginning of the invasion, Metropolitan Onuphryy was not ready for a direct conflict with the Russian Orthodox Church and its leader Patriarch Kirill. This has led to a serious crisis within the UOC-MP, with clergy reacting in three different ways: 1) withdrawal from the UOC-MP and transition to the OCU, 2) maintaining a pro-Moscow position, up to direct support for Russia, 3) refusal to commemorate Patriarch Kirill and calls for the leadership of the UOC-MP to break the canonical connection with the ROC.

In an effort to respond to the request of believers and priests and, to a much lesser extent, the secular community, in mid-May, the Holy Synod of the UOC-MP decided to hold a meeting of bishops, clergy, monks and laity on May 27, 2022 to discuss the challenges faced by the UOC-MP. At the meeting itself, Metropolitan Onuphryy, referring to the reaction of believers, proposed to consider the issue of autocephaly of the UOC-MP. Due to the fact that only the Council of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church can make a decision on changing the status, on the same day, May 27, Metropolitan Onuphryy initiated and successively held a meeting of the Holy Synod of the UOC-MP, the Council of Bishops of the UOC-MP with the participation of laity, monastics and clergy. As a result, 95% of the participants of the Council of the UOC-MP voted for changing the status of the church^[3]Kak prokhodil Sobor UPTS i kakiye prinyaty resheniya. Díalog.Tut.27 May 2022. https://www.dialogtut.org/kak-prohodil-sobor-upcz-i-kakie-prinyaty-resheniya/.

In its final document, the Council of the UOC-MP condemned the war in the first paragraphs, appealed to the authorities of Ukraine and Russia with a call to continue searching for ways to stop the bloodshed, expressed disagreement with the position of Patriarch Kirill of Moscow regarding the war in Ukraine and approved additions and amendments to the Statute on the management of the UOC-MP "which testify about the complete independence of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church”^[4]Resolutions of the Council of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of May 27, 2022. Ukrainian Orthodox Church. 28 May 2022. … Continue reading.

Despite the enormous pressure exerted by the Ukrainian society, the parishioners of the UOC-MP and the authorities of Ukraine, the leadership of the UOC-MP was not ready to violate the canonical rules (as they understand them) in favor of a pro-state position. Nevertheless, the decisions of the Council removed significant tension within the church community, and to some extent calmed the authorities, who expected decisive steps from the UOC to break with the ROC.

Instead, the UOC-MP episcopate pursued a wait-and-see policy. As the current head of the State Service for Ethnopolitics and Freedom of Conscience Viktor Yelenskyy noted, even under the conditions of a full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine, the UOC-MP "did not manage to sever ties with Moscow, condemn collaborators, remove bishops who cooperated with the occupation authorities, and failed to leave the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC)"^[5]Rzheutska L. Is "church compromise" possible in the Kyiv-Pechersk Lavra? Deutsche Welle. 6 квітня 2023. … Continue reading. According to him, under these conditions, the state began to consider the issue of the impossibility of activity on the territory of Ukraine of any religious structures that are connected with the aggressor.

In late 2022-early 2023, the state increased pressure on the UOC-MP. By his Decree No. 898/2022 of December 28, 2022, President Zelensky suspended the citizenship of a number of priests of the UOC-MP, Ukrainian media sharing the list of 13 clergymen^[6]Epiphanius in the Lavra. For the first time in the history of the OCU, the Christmas service is held in the Kyiv-Pechersk Lavra … Continue reading. At the beginning of 2023, the lease of the temples on the territory of the so-called “upper Lavra” was terminated with the UOC-MP. Representatives of the UOC-MP claim that this is a violation of the law and are trying to challenge the termination of the lease in court. At the same time, in those churches that the state stopped leasing to the UOC-MP, the first public Christmas service was held by representatives of the OCU, led by Metropolitan Epiphanius, who received a one-time permit from the government^[7]https://www.radiosvoboda.org/a/epifaniy-ptsu-bohosluzhinnya-lavra-rizdvo-7-sichnya/32212733.html. In his address to the monks of the Lavra, he noted that "the time has come to finally free ourselves from the uncanonical rule over you of Moscow and its servants^[8]News about Christmas service in Lavra on the official website of OCU: … Continue reading". Against the backdrop of government support, the rhetoric of Metropolitan Epiphanius has changed, who in his latest interviews says that the only way for UOC-MP representatives is to join the OCU, and that the OCU "simply tolerates the presence of the Moscow Patriarchate^[9]Metropolitan Epiphany: "We simply tolerate the presence of the MP - they have no right to be on our territory" … Continue reading". In his Christmas greetings to Ukrainians, the head of the Ecumenical Patriarchate, Patriarch Bartholomew, also voiced the position that uniting all Orthodox believers in the country around the OCU was the only possible solution^[10]Christmas greetings from Patriarch Bartolomew https://www.radiosvoboda.org/a/news-patriarkh-varfolomiy-rizdvo-pryvitannya/32213534.html.

Attention to the UOC-MP on the part of the Ukrainian Security services has increased significantly. In particular, according to official data, in 2022 were conducted more than 40 counterintelligence and security measures in the church environment of the UOC-MP. 61 criminal proceedings were instituted against 61 clergymen. In total, the courts have already issued 7 verdicts against individual clerics, including 2 of them were used in exchange for Ukrainian prisoners of war. Sanctions were introduced against 17 officials of the UOC-MP, and almost 250 clerics of the Russian Orthodox Church were banned from entering Ukraine. Also, the citizenship of Ukraine was terminated for 19 clergymen of the UOC-MP, citizens of the aggressor country, the forced return to the country of origin of church clerics, 2 citizens of Russia were initiated^[11]The SSU reported the suspicion to Metropolitan Pavlo of the UOC (MP) (video). Security Service of Ukraine. https://ssu.gov.ua/novyny/sbu-povidomyla-pro-pidozru-mytropolytu-upts-mp-pavlu-video.

The change in state policy towards the UOC-MP was accompanied by a change in the leadership of the "Ministry of Religions" - the State Service for Ethnopolitics and Freedom of Conscience. Instead of the sociologist Olena Bohdan, who at the beginning of her work declared equidistant from all religious denominations, and later was criticized for her favorable attitude to the UOC-MP, the head of the SSEFC was appointed a religious scholar and politician Viktor Yelenskyy, who criticized the UOC-MP.

At the end of 2022, a meeting of the National Security and Defense Council took place, where the government was instructed to develop a draft law that would make it impossible for church structures with centers located in the aggressor country, that is, in Russia. As Viktor Yelenskyy explained, if it is adopted in its current version, in order to understand whether this or that religious structure is connected with the centers in the aggressor country, a religious examination should be appointed. If the examination establishes the fact of the subordination of a religious organization to the center in the aggressor country, the SSEFC must apply to this organization with an order to eliminate these ties. If the church removes these ties, then all claims against that church are lost. If not, then SSEFC should file a lawsuit in court^[12]Rzheutska, op. cit..

Also, the NSDC instructed the SSEFC to ensure, within a two-month period, a religious examination of the Statute on the Administration of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church for the presence of a church-canonical connection with the Moscow Patriarchate (Russian Orthodox Church). According to the conclusions of this examination, "UOC-MP relative to the Russian Orthodox Church has an ecclesiastical-canonical connection of the part with the whole^[13]The conclusion of the religious examination of the Statute on the Administration of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church on the existence of a church-canonical connection with the Moscow Patriarchate. State … Continue reading”. In its conclusions, the expert group that carried out the examination claimed that "the UOC-MP ... from the point of view of ecclesiology and canon law is a structural division of the Russian Orthodox Church" - despite the fact that one of the claims that were made before the examination was precisely that , that there were no specialists in canon law in the expert group, moreover, a religious examination is not a theological examination, and in this context, the appeal to ecclesiology and canon law looks rather contradictory. Another reason for criticism was the composition of the expert group. The head of the legal department of the UOC-MP, archpriest Oleksandr Bakhov appealed with a statement of no confidence and dismissal of some members of the expert group, because, in his opinion, "some members of the expert group are not only parishioners of the Orthodox Church of Ukraine, but also show bias and hostility towards the UOC-MP, which was repeatedly published in social networks and mass media^[14]A statement was sent to remove biased experts from the commission for examination of the UOC Statute and involve international religious scholars in its work. Legal department of the UOC. January 10, … Continue reading".

Radical sentiments in society in relation to the UOC are actively fueled by the ally and sponsor of the OCU - the former president of Ukraine, Petro Poroshenko, who, even during his presidency, actively instrumentalized the religious issue, using the formation of an autocephalous church in Ukraine as an important component of his election campaign^[15]Brylov, D., Kalenychenko, T. and A. Kryshtal. (2021), The Religious Factor in Conflict Research on the Peacebuilding Potential of Religious Communities in Ukraine. Analytical Report. PAX, 2021: 12.. In early April 2023, Poroshenko called on local councils across the country (mainly regional – oblast – level) to terminate lease agreements with the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of Moscow Patriarchate, and the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine to adopt a bill banning it:

“The ground must go under the feet of the Moscow Church [referring to the UOC-MP - author] - literally and figuratively at the same time... The party leadership today decided to oblige the deputies of local councils from "European Solidarity" to terminate lease agreements for premises and land plots for all the temples near Moscow. We appeal to colleagues from other patriotic political forces across the country to support these decisions. This problem should not be extinguished point by point, but should be solved systematically as a threat to national security. Not to take away Lavra after Lavra, but already next week in the Verkhovna Rada to consider the draft law initiated by us on banning the ROC, which in Ukraine is called the UOC of the Moscow (!) "patriarchy"”^[16]Poroshenko demands to terminate the lease with the Mospatriarchy throughout the country and to pass a law banning religious services. Official website of the European Solidarity party. April 3, 2023. … Continue reading.

At the same time, the "European Solidarity" party appealed to the government and all local authorities with a call to immediately terminate the lease relationship with the UOC-MP wherever this church occupied historical premises. The party also announced that the "ES" factions in local authorities will initiate such a review of lease relations with the UOC-MP^[17]"Eurosolidarity" calls for the implementation of the law on renaming the Mospatriarchy - statement of the faction. Official website of the European Solidarity party. April 3, 2023. … Continue reading. It is important to note that in most cases during 2022, it was the deputies of the "EU" in the regional councils who initiated the ban of the UOC-MP in their regions or appealed to the Verkhovna Rada regarding its legislative ban - despite the fact that such a ban on the part of the regional councils is not within their powers and is illegal^[18]Rzheutska L. Is "church compromise" possible in the Kyiv-Pechersk Lavra? Deutsche Welle. 6 квітня 2023. … Continue reading. According to our sources inside the UOC-MP, in an attempt to seize the initiative in the public sphere from the political forces of the main opponent of the current president, the authorities fundamentally changed their attitude towards the UOC-MP.

The pressure from the current authorities on the UOC-MP is constantly increasing. For example, as one of the main public speakers, adviser to the Head of the Office of the President of Ukraine, Mykhailo Podolyak, said at the end of March 2023: "I think that we will reach the end of what is right, the Ukrainian Orthodox Church will lose all opportunities to influence the internal world of Ukraine in one way or another. The UOC will gradually go to Russian cities and do something there, within the framework of a branch of the Russian Orthodox Church, and in Ukraine there will be an OCU, only an OCU^[19]Podolyak Pasha will give the Mercedes to the ZSU?/ Important about the counteroffensive! 24 Channel. March 30, 2023. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=otf4Ha3JP70». Against the background of such statements and the rupture of the lease agreement of the Kyiv-Pechora Lavra with the church by the state, a campaign to squeeze the UOC-MP from the regions is unfolding, which is sometimes accompanied by violent clashes between supporters of the OCU and priests and believers of the UOC-MP.

Recently, the situation with the Kyiv-Pechersk Lavra, a monastic complex of the 11th century, one of the largest Christian centers of Ukraine, has received the most attention in public space. KPL consists of two parts - Upper and Lower Lavra. The state did not extend the lease of the Upper Lavra, where most of the churches are located, from January 1, 2023. Already on March 10, 2023, the state reserve "Kyiv-Pechersk Lavra" informed the UOC-MP that the latter should vacate the buildings on its balance sheet by March 29. The reason for this decision by the state was that the interdepartmental working group found that the monastery had violated the terms of the contract regarding the use of state property^[20]Saakov V. Reserve "Kyiv-Pechersk Lavra" terminates the contract with the UOC MP. Deutsche Welle. March 10, 2023. … Continue reading. Unlike the non-renewal of the lease of the Upper Lavra, the termination of the lease of the Lower Lavra caused opposition from the UOC-MP.

Cases of violent confrontation and transfers of parishes to another jurisdiction without the consent of the parties began to attract even more attention. One of the latest public cases is the beating of a military serviceman at one of the parishes of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of Ukraine in Khmelnytskyy^[21]In the Khmelnytskyi cathedral, supporters of the Mospatriarchy beat a military man  https://vsim.ua/Podii/u-tserkvi-hmelnitskogo-prihilniki-mospatriarhatu-pobili-viyskovogo-vid-11782755.html. However, as it turned out later, the victim never served in the Armed Forces of Ukraine, however, this did not affect the public condemnation and indignation at the actions of the ministers. Another recent situation was in Ivano-Frankivsk, Western Ukraine, where the last UOC-MP parish in the city switched to OCU in a violent way too^[22]With skirmishes and tear gas: in Frankivsk, the last church of the UOC MP in the region was transferred to the OCU … Continue reading. Although society's demand for justice and the severing of any ties with Moscow is obvious, the choice of violent actions and their overt or tacit support by regional or central authorities cannot have a legitimate or legal justification.

On March 24, the UN published a report by the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, in which considerable attention was paid to the situation surrounding the UOC-MP. In particular, the report examines three bills under consideration in the Verkhovna Rada regarding the restriction or ban of the UOC-MP (bills No. 8221, No. 8262, and No. 8371), and regarding Bill No. 8221 it is stated, that due to vague legal terminology and the absence of sufficient justification, the limitations of the freedom to manifest one’s religion contained in the draft law cannot be regarded as “prescribed by law” and “necessary” within the meaning of article 18(3) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)^[23]Report on the human rights situation in Ukraine, 1 August 2022 – 31 January 2023. OHCHR. 24 March 2023, р. 32.. In general, the report expressed concern that the actions of the Ukrainian authorities regarding the UOC-MP may be discriminatory.

In response, the speaker of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Oleg Nikolenko called OHCHR "refrain from unbalanced political assessments, and base your reports on facts," and stated that Ukraine guarantees freedom of religion, but this freedom "does not equate to the right to engage in activities that undermine national security^[24]Oleg Nikolenko official Facebook page. 27 March 2023. https://www.facebook.com/oleg.nikolenko.50/posts/pfbid023vqRiChD6h4MsqojvB1x7u5Dst6Qfv48ypVsGkW4Ba9eba13QxHMCNva6FJ6f6nvl".

At the same time, as noted by Dmytro Vovk, the chairman of the Center for the Rule of Law and Religion Studies at Yaroslav Mudryi National Law University, «the UN Human Rights Committee's General Comment 22 on Article 18 ("Freedom of thought, conscience and religion") of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) notes that national security is not a permissible reason to limit freedom of religion or belief, and that "this right is non-derogable even during times of national emergency threatening the life of the nation"»^[25]Vovk D. UKRAINE: Kyiv Pechersk Lavra conflict, draft law, impact on freedom of religion or belief. Forum 18. 6 April 2023. https://www.forum18.org/archive.php?article_id=2823.

When this article was almost ready, new information was added to the inter-Orthodox conflict in Ukraine. Journalists published an investigation, according to which the head of the UOC-MP, Metropolitan Onufriy, has a Russian passport. Metropolitan Onufriy himself stated that he does not consider himself a citizen of Russia, although after the collapse of the Soviet Union, his Russian citizenship was automatically extended. But after the deterioration of Russian-Ukrainian relations in recent years, he does not consider himself a Russian citizen: «…now I do not regard myself as a citizen of any country save for my native land – Ukraine^[26]His Beatitude Metropolitan Onufriy emphasises that he is a citizen only of Ukraine and explains where other rumours have come from. Ukrainian Orthodox Church. 9 April 2023. … Continue reading».

The situation around the Orthodox churches for the Ukrainian society is sometimes more emotional than the news from the frontline. The national unity suffers primarily from this conflict, and the UOC-MP is also rapidly losing its positions. At the same time, the Orthodox Church of Ukraine may later turn out to be one of the affected parties. As Cyrill Hovorun points out, despite the tactical advantages of weakening (or in general total ban) the UOC-MP, which are manifested primarily in the replacement of the former monopoly in the Kyiv-Pechersk Lavra with the monopoly of the OCU, strategically the latter has little to gain from this. Moreover, it is rather possible to talk about the losses of the OCU, since, according to Hovorun, the perception of the OCU in the world has worsened, in particular - among the churches that hesitated to recognize its autocephaly^[27]Archimandrite Kyrylo Govorun. In the conflict around the Lavra, everyone is still losing. League.net. April 4, 2023. … Continue reading. Moreover, the OCU, supporting the general pressure on the UOC, in the future may become dependent on the Ecumenical Patriarchate, on the one hand, and on the state, on the other. First of all, this concerns the status of the patriarchate, desired and expected by a large part of the priesthood of the OCU. On the other hand, extremely painful in the conditions of the mass departure of Ukrainian refugees abroad (according to the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, more than 5 million Ukrainian refugees are registered in European countries alone^[28]Ukraine Refugee Situation. Refugees Operational Data Portal by UNHCR. 4 April 2023. https://data.unhcr.org/en/situations/ukraine#_ga=2.228732760.514168680.1646989952-176134281.1646551413) there is the issue of feeding the diaspora, which, according to Tomos, remains for Constantinople. But in the conditions of the postponement of the recognition of the autocephaly of the OCU, which we talked about above, concessions in favor of the OCU on the part of the Ecumenical Patriarchate seem unlikely.

As for dependence on the state, the authorities, having provided tangible support to the OCU in the confrontation with the UOC-MP, will most likely expect a loyal attitude towards themselves from the believers and structures of the OCU. But it is extremely difficult to say how far the boundaries of such loyalty will reach. In general, summarizing the urgent state of affairs in inter-Orthodox relations in Ukraine, we can agree with Kyryll Hovorun that the most important consequence of the events taking place was that the mental distance between Ukrainians who identify themselves with the UOC and the OCU has increased significantly, and therefore the consolidation of Ukrainian Orthodoxy is further delayed.