Bulletin N°37

mai 2022

“Muslim Legions” of the Russian Army – English version

Denis Brylov

With the Russian invasion of Ukraine, we hear more often about mercenaries from the Middle East, primarily Syria and Libya, taking part in the hostilities from the Russian side. The very idea of recruiting Arab militants for the war with Ukraine was expressed by Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu; he first voiced it during a meeting of the Russian Security Council on March 11. According to his statement, more than 16 thousand people from the Middle East volunteered to join the Russian forces. Russian President Vladimir Putin commented on this fact: "We need to support them and help move to the territory of hostilities[1]Putin Spoke on Sending 'Volunteers' from the Middle East to Ukraine, {Online] https://www.bbc.com/russian/news-60707686.".

Later on, on March 17, 2022, the Ukrainian General Staff also reported the possibility of recruiting ca. a thousand militants from Syria and the Lebanese Hezbollah organization. The operational summary reported that the key requirement for mercenaries was their experience in urban combat. It was also noted that the true goal of the Middle Eastern volunteers was not to take part in hostilities on the territory of Ukraine but to get an opportunity to reach the EU countries[2]Operational information on 24.00, 17.03.2022 regarding the #russian_invasion, {Online] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/274825134830572..

According to the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, which independent sources have not confirmed, about 40,000 Arab mercenaries have currently enlisted: 22,000 as a part of the Russian armed forces and about 18,000 as part of the Russian PMC Wagner Group. At the same time, in recent weeks, about 700 troops of the 25th Special Forces Division, known in Syria as the "Tiger Force" under the command of Brig. Gen. Suheil al-Hassan, went to Russia[3]Syrian fighters ready to join next phase of Ukraine war, [Online] https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-putin-islamic-state-group-syria-europe-4ede428219450a58b0439912bc43cc15.. The Ukrainian authorities have confirmed that approximately 500 mercenaries from Libya and Syria participated in the hostilities in the Luhansk and Donetsk regions. Some of them were destroyed by the Ukrainian military on April 18[4]Danilov: Ukrainian Armed Forces Destroyed a Group of Lebanese and Syrians in the East, [Online] https://www.ukrinform.ua/rubric-ato/3463326-na-shodi-zsu-znisili-zagin-livijciv-ta-sirijciv-danilov.html.

Aside from the purely military side of the Russian army using Arab mercenaries, there is also a religious dimension, i.e., to what extent Muslim mercenaries can be integrated into the Russian army, given the dominance of Orthodoxy both among Russians and in the Russian army. It would suffice to recall the recent opening of the Main Cathedral of the Russian Armed Forces in 2018, as well as the position of Patriarch Kirill and the Russian Orthodox Church in the Russian-Ukrainian conflict. And what is the general position of Muslims in the armed forces of Russia and is there a place for Islam?

As few available studies show, the topic of Islam and Muslims in the Russian army remains extremely painful. First of all, military sociologists point to a constantly growing level of religiosity in the army: in 1990, 14% of military personnel considered themselves believers, in 1992 – 22%, in 1996 – 34%, then in 2006 – already 68%[5]Oleynikov S. & A. Khlynin, "Religious situation in the armed forces of Russian Federation", Vestnik MGLU. Obshestvennie nauki, no. 3 (840), 2020, p. 197.. At the same time, the share of Muslims in the Russian armed forces changes in leaps. From 2008 to 2010, the number of military personnel who consider themselves Muslims increased from 3% to 10%. By 2014, it decreased to 6%, in 2017, it increased to 7%, and in 2019, it reached 9%.

Despite the fact that Muslims make up about a tenth of the personnel of the armed forces, there are only two army imams-chaplains (whereas the number of Orthodox chaplains is 147). Out of 300 religious buildings on the territory of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation (as of 2015), Muslim military personnel have only 1 mosque, 1 religious center and 5 prayer rooms[6]Interaction of the Russian Armed Forces with Religious Associations: Current Development of the Tradition, [Online] … Continue reading.

The lack of imams-chaplains and prayer rooms is not the only difficulty Muslim military personnel have. Serious problems are also caused by the lack of halal food in the armed forces, the ability to perform five daily prayers and fasting in the month of Ramadan. Some Muslims refuse to pronounce the text of the military oath, citing the fact that Islam forbids to swear to anyone or anything other than Allah. Sometimes, in private, this problem is solved by the fact that Muslim soldiers say "I pledge" instead of "I swear." According to one of the Muslim soldiers, it is extremely rare for practicing Muslims to join the army because of such problems[7]Is it easy to be a Muslim in the army?, [Online]  https://kazved.ru/news/legko-li-musulmaninu-v-armii-5702692..

Considering the problems described, it is not surprising that there are more cases of religion-driven evasion from military duties among Muslim military personnel than among representatives of other faiths. Muslims make up about half (47%)[8]Oleynikov S. & A. Khlynin, "Religious situation in the armed forces of Russian Federation", Vestnik MGLU. Obshestvennie nauki, no. 3 (840), 2020, p. 204. of all cases of such evasion.

The Russian Ministry of Defense leadership is also not particularly happy with the Muslims in the army, at least with the people from the North Caucasus. For example, conscription from the Chechen Republic to the armed forces was resumed only in 2014 after a long break. According to Alexander Kanshin, Chairman of the National Security Committee of the Civic Chamber, although it is known that Chechens are good at fighting, the problem with their military service remains, as there are fears that they will eventually join the ranks of extremists after having military training in the army[9]Experts fear conflicts in case of enlistment of Chechen residents, [Online] https://www.rbc.ru/politics/21/09/2014/570422739a794760d3d41a2b.

The reluctance to recruit Muslims to the Russian army is also evidenced if we analyse of the annual conscription, which shows that the number of annually conscripted residents of the "Muslim" republics of Russia is noticeably lower than the draft potential in these republics. For example, in the autumn conscription in 2016, about 1.5 thousand Dagestanis were selected for military service, although 50 thousand people in total were subject to conscription in the region. More than 4 thousand people were called up from Tatarstan, 20 thousand people were subject to conscription, 500 recruits were called up from Chechnya, although the number of potential recruits in the republic is more than 86 thousand people. 350 conscripts were taken from the Republic of Ingushetia for military service, although 12 thousand people were subject to conscription[10]Can Muslim serve in the Russian army? Pros and cons, [Online]  https://alif.tv/mozhno-li-musulmanam-sluzhit-v-rossijskoj-armii-za-i-protiv/. The situation in Dagestan is somewhat different — in 2011, only 121 people were called up from Dagestan (and almost all of them were not Caucas-native), in 2019, there were 3 thousand of them, and in 2020 – 4200 people. Such a difference in Dagestan is explained by a significant reduction in the level of violence (70 times from 2010 to 2020) associated with the activities of the underground armed forces[11]Dzutsati V. "No trust": has the Russian army refused Ingushi and Chechens once again?, [Online] https://www.kavkazr.com/a/31188967.html.

Thus, it is apparent that Sunni Muslims are not particularly welcome in the Russian army, and it is doubtful that the situation will change soon. Perhaps that is why the Russian military prefers Hezbollah fighters (Shia), Syrian Alawites (Nuseirs), and Christians even when recruiting mercenaries among the Syrians. In particular, the readiness to send militants to Ukraine to fight alongside the Russian army was expressed by Nabel al-Abdullah, the commander of the Syrian government paramilitary national defense militia in the city of Al-Suqaylabiyah (Hama Governorate), and an Orthodox Christian closely associated with the Russian military from the Khmeimim base. Together with Simon al-Wakil, commander of the National Defense Forces in the city of Maharda, also a Christian, al-Abdullah launched a mobilization of Christians to be sent to Ukraine. According to local Sunnis, preference is given to Alawites and Christians when recruiting volunteers. Sunni volunteers must pass a security check before being accepted and get a recommendation from someone close to Russian forces, such as al-Abdullah or General Suheil al-Hassan[12]Khaled al-Khateb, Syrian Christian militia leader ready to join Russian forces in Ukraine war, [Online] … Continue reading.

Such discrimination against Sunnis, both in the Russian military and in the recruitment of volunteers in the Middle East, is rooted in Russian history. This was largely facilitated by the complex relations between Russia and predominantly Sunni Turkey, the Caucasian War (1817-1864), and, more recently, the First and Second Chechen Wars, as well as the invasion of militants into Dagestan in 1999. Against this background, Shiism turned out to be more preferable for the Russian authorities, given the close historical ties between Russia and Persia. It suffices to recall the Persian Cossack division at the court of the Shah, or the influence of Russia in Northern Iran following the results of the Anglo-Russian agreement of 1907. Shiism turned out to be more sympathetic to the main player of the Russian religious scene, namely Patriarch Kirill, who, being Chairman of the Department for External Church Relations of the Russian Orthodox Church, made a lot of efforts to create the Joint Russian-Iranian Commission for the "Orthodoxy-Islam" dialogue[13]Patriarch Kirill met with the Iranian ambassador to Russia, [Online] http://www.patriarchia.ru/db/text/5916391.html in 1997. In 2022, it plans to gather for the twelfth time.

Hence, there is no surprise that anti-Sunni and pro-Shiite ideas were natural to Vladimir Putin from the first days of his presidency. Giving an interview to Larry King in 2000, in the first year of his presidency, Putin said: “when our troops entered Chechnya... it turned out that a new ideological platform for Chechnya was thrown in from outside. It was religious, it came from the Middle East. They started to impose the Sunni interpretation of Islam on the local population, and our people in the Caucasus are mostly Shiites[14]Interview with a CNN journalist Larry King, September 8, 2000, [Online]  http://kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/21558". He voiced this opinion despite the fact that the Russian part of the Caucasus is inhabited mainly by Sunnis, with a slight presence of Shiite communities.

It is also noteworthy that the Kadyrov Chechens, the most Moscow-loyal part of the Muslim fighters participating in the Russian invasion of Ukraine, also adhere to religious views that are very reminiscent of some Shiite theological concepts. It is known that Ramzan Kadyrov is a follower of the Sufi order Qadiriyya, namely its Chechen branch of the Khoja Muridiya. The founder of this Sufism trend, Kunta-hadji Kishiev, died in Russian captivity in 1867.

However, largely at the suggestion of Ramzan Kadyrov himself, whose ancestor Ilyas was a student of Kunta-hadji and who exploits the image of a sheikh to strengthen his personal authority, there are more and more assertions among the followers of Hodja-Muridiyya that Kishiev did not die, but continues to preach until now. For example, in January 2020, the Mufti of Chechnya, Salakh Mezhiev, stated during religious events in memory of Kunta-hadji Kishiev in Shali that the sheikh was alive and preaching Islam in different countries[15]Chechnya residents criticized the mufti for his statements about Kunta-hadji Kishiev, [Online]  https://www.kavkaz-uzel.eu/articles/344316.. According to the followers of Kunta-Khoja, he did not die but concealed: i.e., moved into the state of ghaybah, or "occultation", which is a purely Shiite concept.

Existing problems for Muslims in the Russian army have only intensified since the beginning of the Russian invasion in Ukraine. First of all, the high proportion of servicemen from the Muslim regions of Russia among the dead and captured by the Ukrainian side attracts attention. On the other hand, there is a mixed reaction among Russian Muslims themselves. The official muftiats unanimously supported the Russian invasion, while religious figures opposed to the Russian authorities and the official muftiats condemned it. Particularly strong criticism of the participation of Muslims in the Russian invasion comes from the Salafi communities. For example, the well-known Salafi preacher Abu Umar Sasitlinsky generally stated that Muslims serving under contract in the Russian army are apostates[16]Abu Umar Sasitlinskyi, The Putin War in Ukraine, [Online] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rGUKpHQVl_0.. Therefore, it is implausible that any positive changes in the current situation of Muslims in the Russian army are to be expected in the near future.

 

Notes

Notes
1 Putin Spoke on Sending 'Volunteers' from the Middle East to Ukraine, {Online] https://www.bbc.com/russian/news-60707686.
2 Operational information on 24.00, 17.03.2022 regarding the #russian_invasion, {Online] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/274825134830572.
3 Syrian fighters ready to join next phase of Ukraine war, [Online] https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-putin-islamic-state-group-syria-europe-4ede428219450a58b0439912bc43cc15.
4 Danilov: Ukrainian Armed Forces Destroyed a Group of Lebanese and Syrians in the East, [Online] https://www.ukrinform.ua/rubric-ato/3463326-na-shodi-zsu-znisili-zagin-livijciv-ta-sirijciv-danilov.html
5 Oleynikov S. & A. Khlynin, "Religious situation in the armed forces of Russian Federation", Vestnik MGLU. Obshestvennie nauki, no. 3 (840), 2020, p. 197.
6 Interaction of the Russian Armed Forces with Religious Associations: Current Development of the Tradition, [Online] https://web.archive.org/web/20150315134249/http://pobeda.ru/vzaimodeystvie-vooruzhennyih-sil-rossii-s-religioznyimi-obedineniyami-sovremennoe-razvitie-traditsii.html/
7 Is it easy to be a Muslim in the army?, [Online]  https://kazved.ru/news/legko-li-musulmaninu-v-armii-5702692.
8 Oleynikov S. & A. Khlynin, "Religious situation in the armed forces of Russian Federation", Vestnik MGLU. Obshestvennie nauki, no. 3 (840), 2020, p. 204.
9 Experts fear conflicts in case of enlistment of Chechen residents, [Online] https://www.rbc.ru/politics/21/09/2014/570422739a794760d3d41a2b
10 Can Muslim serve in the Russian army? Pros and cons, [Online]  https://alif.tv/mozhno-li-musulmanam-sluzhit-v-rossijskoj-armii-za-i-protiv/
11 Dzutsati V. "No trust": has the Russian army refused Ingushi and Chechens once again?, [Online] https://www.kavkazr.com/a/31188967.html
12 Khaled al-Khateb, Syrian Christian militia leader ready to join Russian forces in Ukraine war, [Online] https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2022/03/syrian-christian-militia-leader-ready-join-russian-forces-ukraine-war.
13 Patriarch Kirill met with the Iranian ambassador to Russia, [Online] http://www.patriarchia.ru/db/text/5916391.html
14 Interview with a CNN journalist Larry King, September 8, 2000, [Online]  http://kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/21558
15 Chechnya residents criticized the mufti for his statements about Kunta-hadji Kishiev, [Online]  https://www.kavkaz-uzel.eu/articles/344316.
16 Abu Umar Sasitlinskyi, The Putin War in Ukraine, [Online] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rGUKpHQVl_0.
Pour citer ce document :
Denis Brylov, "“Muslim Legions” of the Russian Army – English version". Bulletin de l'Observatoire international du religieux N°37 [en ligne], mai 2022. https://obsreligion.cnrs.fr/bulletin/muslim-legions-of-the-russian-army-english-version/
Bulletin
Numéro : 37
mai 2022

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Auteur.e.s

Denis Brylov, associate professor at the Department of. Theology and Religious Studies, National Pedagogical. Dragomanov University (Kyiv, Ukraine)

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